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Abstract 
Recent research has found that diagnostic perfor­
mance with Bayesian belief networks is often 
surprisingly insensitive to imprecision in the 
numerical probabilities. For example, the authors 
have recently completed an extensive study in 
which they applied random noise to the numeri­
cal probabilities in a set of belief networks for 
medical diagnosis, subsets of the CPCS network, 
a subset of the QMR (Quick Medical Reference) 
focused on liver and bile diseases. The diagnostic 
performance in terms of the average probabilities 
assigned to the actual diseases showed small sen­
sitivity even to large amounts of noise. In this 
paper, we summarize the findings of this study 
and discuss possible explanations of this low sen­
sitivity. One reason is that the criterion for perfor­
mance is  ave r age  p r obabil i ty  of the t rue  
hypotheses, rather than average error in probabil­
ity, which is insensitive to symmetric noise distri­
butions. But, we show that even asymmetric, 
logodds-normal noise has modest effects. A sec­
ond reason is that the gold-standard posterior 
probabilities are often near zero or one, and are 
little disturbed by noise. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Many researchers have criticized the use of probabilistic 
representations in general, and belief networks in particu­
lar, because of the need to provide many numbers to spec­
ify the conditional probability distributions. These 
numbers may be judged directly by experts in the domain 
of interest, or they may be obtained by fitting a belief net­
work to a set of observed cases. In either case, they are 
liable to imprecision, due to the difficulty people have in 
expressing their beliefs numerically. or due to the finite 
amounts of case data available for estimation. If very pre­
cise numbers are needed, these criticisms would have con­
siderable bite. If rough approximations are adequate, then 
they may lose their sting. 
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In recent research, we have explored empirically the ques­
tion of how precise these probabilities need to be to obtain 
adequate performance from the belief network for diag­
nostic inference. Overall, we have been surprised at the 
degree of robustness of belief networks that we have found 
to imprecision in the probabilities. The primary goal of 
this paper is to explore possible reasons for this robustness 
so that we can better understand how it arises, when we 
can rely on it, and when we cannot. By better understand­
ing how the diagnostic performance is affected by error or 
uncertainty in the probabilities, we can discover how pre­
cisely we need to estimate the probabilities, and hence 
whether or when belief networks can be practical and reli­
able. 
2 FINDINGS OF ROBUSTNESS 
Our investigation was based on a series of real-world 
Bayesian belief networks (BNs), rather than on the ran­
domly generated, abstract knowledge bases (KBs) used in 
much of the experimental research to compare knowledge 
representations. Although it is easy to generate BNs with a 
wide range of different characteristics - such as ratio of 
arcs to nodes, ratio of source nodes to internal nodes, or 
frequency of directed cycles- we wanted to focus on 
BNs that have the characteristics of real application 
domains. We believe such BNs are more likely to be rele­
vant to other real application domains than artificially-gen­
erated networks. The problem domain that we use in this 
study is medical diagnosis for hepatobiliary disorders 
(liver and bile diseases). 
Numerical probabilities for belief networks may be esti­
mated from empirical data or assessed by experts. In either 
case, the numbers are subject to various sources of inaccu­
racy and bias. For example, the data may be obtained from 
a sample that is not truly representative of the application 
domain, or the expert may have nonrepresentative experi­
ence. Limited sample sizes lead to random error. The pro­
cess of expert assessment of probabilities is subject to a 
variety of inaccuracies which have been the subject of 
extensive study. [Kahneman, et al.1982] The question we 
wish to address here is how far these sources of impreci­
sion are likely to matter. 
We performed experiments to examine the sensitivity of 
BNs to the expert probabilities. In the experiments, we 
assessed the effects of random noise in the numerical 
probabilities on diagnostic performance, measured as the 
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probability assigned to the correct diagnosis averaged over 
a large number of diagnostic test cases, for three different 
BNs. We added random noise to the probabilities derived 
from the standard, empirically derived mapping [Hecker­
man and Miller 1986] from frequency weights into proba­
bilities. We added noise separately to the link 
probabilities, leak probabilities, and the prior probabili­
ties. By examining the effect of noise separately on each 
of these three types of probability, we were able to differ­
entiate among them in terms of their effect on diagnostic 
performance. 
2.1 EXPERIMENTAL NETWORKS 
We derived the experimental BNs from an early quasi­
probabilistic KB, the Computer-based Patient Case Simu­
lation (CPCS) [Parker and Miller 1987)]. CPCS uses a 
representation derived from the Internist- I [Miller, et a!. 
1982] and Quick Medical Reference (QMR) [Miller, et al. 
1986] expert systems. In these knowledge bases, causal 
links, such as relationships between diseases and findings 
are quantified as frequency weights, specifying the chance 
that one diseases will give rise to a finding or other vari­
able, on a five-point qualitative scale. In previous work, 
our group developed a method to convert from the Inter­
nist-! /QMR representation to a belief network representa­
tion, with specific independence assumptions­
conditional independence of findings given diseases, 
noisy-OR influences of diseases on findings, and marginal 
independence of diseases [Shwe, et a!. 1991J. Empirical 
comparison of QMR with the probabilistic reformulation, 
QMR-BN, demonstrated comparable diagnostic perfor­
mance [Middleton, et al. 1991], even though some infor­
mation (e.g. linkages between diseases) was not employed 
inQMR-BN. 
Our first task in the current work was to convert the CPCS 
knowledge base into a coherent BN, mapping frequency 
weights into link probabilities, which are the conditional 
probabilities of each finding given each disease. We also 
had to assess additional leak probabilities, to quantify the 
chance that each finding , or other variable, will be present 
but not caused by one of the diseases or other variable in 
the knowledge base, and prior probabilities to quantify the 
prevalence rate of each disease or predisposing factor. 
Because CPCS-BN is large and multiply-connected, it is 
impractical to perform inference with available inference 
algorithms using the entire network. If we wish to com­
pute only the posterior probabilities of a small set of dis­
eases, we can perform inference using only the 
subnetwork of the CPCS network that is relevant. We 
selected subnetworks from the full CPCS-BN using the 
BN graphical tool Netview [Pradhan, et al,l994]. Netview 
allows the user to display selected subsets of nodes from a 
network for simplicity of visualization and editing. 
We extracted three subnetworks from the full CPCS-BN 
for the experiments, named BN2, BN3, and BN4, contain­
ing two, three, and four diseases. W hile CPCS has 365 
nodes, BN2, BN3, and BN4 contain 42, 146, and 245 
nodes, respectively. 
2.2 'lEST CASES 
We needed far more test cases to estimate reliably the 
effects of the experimental manipulations on the diagnos­
tic performance than the small number of cases available 
from real patient data. Accordingly, we generated sample 
test cases directly from the BNs themselves, generating 
findings according to the probabilities specified by the net­
work using logic sampling [Henrion 1988]. We used the 
full CPCS network and the standard probability mapping 
for generating the test cases. 
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Figure 1. The average probability of the true diagnosis as 
a function of the Phase (amount of evidence) for each net­
work without noise. 
Since we wanted to investigate how the amount of evi­
dence affects sensitivity to the experimental manipula­
tions, we generated cases with varying numbers of 
findings. The test cases, as initially generated, include val­
ues for all findings. To create harder cases with fewer find­
ings, and also for greater medical realism, we created five 
cases from each initial case, by revealing the findings in 
five Phases, approximating the order in which findings 
would be revealed in a real medical consultation. The five 
Phases correspond to successive stages in medical diagno­
sis. Phase 1 includes symptoms and findings volunteered 
by the patient- e.g., abdominal pain in the epigastrium. 
Phase 5 includes all previous phases plus expensive, inva­
sive laboratory tests, including pathology findings, which 
are usually obtained through biopsies- e.g., hepatocellu­
lar inflammation and/or necrosis. 
2.3 MEASURES OF DIAGNOSTIC PERFOR­
MANCE 
We quantify diagnostic performance as the probability 
assigned by each network to each true diagnosis, averaged 
over the set of test cases. We analyze separately the proba­
bilities assigned to each disease when present (we call this 
the true positive rate), and the probability assigned to the 
absence of each disease when absent (we call this the true 
negative rate). 
Figure 1 plots the average probability assigned to the true 
diagnosis (true positive and true negative) as a function of 
the Phase for each of the three networks. As expected, 
diagnostic performance improves consistently with Phase 
-that is, the additional findings available in the later 
Phases lead to a higher average posterior probability of the 
true diagnosis. Performance starts out relatively poorly for 
Phase 1, especially for BN3, where the average posterior 
probability for the true diagnosis is 0.22. But, with with 
the entire set of evidence available in Phase 5, diagnostic 
performance becomes excellent, averaging 0.978 over the 
three networks. 
2.4 LOG-ODDS NORMAL NOISE 
Perhaps the most obvious way to add noise to a probability 
is to add a random noise directly to the probability. This 
approach has two problems. First, a large additive error is 
likely to produce a probability greater than 1 or less than 0, 
and so needs to be truncated. Second, an error of plus or 
minus 0.1 seems a lot more serious in a probability of 0.1, 
ranging from 0 to 0.2, than it does in a probability of 0.5, 
ranging from 0.4 to 0.6. Link probabilities near 0 or l can 
have enormous effects in diagnosis for findings that are 
present or absent (respectively). 
A more appealing approach that avoids these problems is 
to add noise to the log-odds rather than the probability. 
This approach can be viewed as a version of Fechner's law 
of psychophysics in which similar just-noticeable differ­
ences in quantities such as weight or brightness are 
approximately constant when measured on a logarithmic 
scale. Since probability has two bounds, 0 and 1, we wish 
to have a symmetric effect near each bound. The log-odds 
transformation provides exactly this behavior. 
More specifically, we transformed each probability pinto 
log-odds form, added normal noise with a standard devia­
tion of cr and transform back into probabilities. We define 
the log-odds transformation as: 
Lo( p ):::::log10[ p/(1-p)] (1) 
We add log-odds noise to the probability as follows: 
p'=Lo-1 [ Lo( p) + e] ,where e =Normal (O,cr) (2) 
Note that the amount of noise implied by Figure l is very 
substantiaL Figure 2 shows second-order probability den­
sity functions for logodds-normal probability distributions 
for sigma 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 2, and 3. For cr :5 0.5, the density 
function is unimodal. For cr � 1, the density function 
becomes bimodal with peaks at zero and one. In other 
words, for cr values of 1 or more, the noise is so extreme 
that most of the probabilities are near zero or one, rather 
than near the gold-standard probability. The logodds-nor­
mal distribution guarantees only that the median probabil­
ity is equal to the gold-standard. The mean probability 
may be very different. 
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Figure 2. Effect of adding Log Odds Normal noise to a 
probability of 0.8. 
2.5 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
We start with binary networks using the standard mapping 
with no noise ( cr = 0), and then add noise, generated inde­
pendently for each link probability in the network, with cr 
= 1.0, cr = 2.0, and cr::::: 3.0. We generated 10 noisy net­
works independently for each cr. Similarly, we created 
noisy networks adding noise only to the leak probabilities, 
and only to the prior probabilities for each network. 
The total number of networks used in this experiment were 
273, comprised of 3 levels of noise X 3 probability types 
(link, leak, and priors) X lO samples X 3 networks, plus the 
original 3 standard networks without noise. For each of 
these networks, we ran the entire set of cases, requiring a 
total of291,200 runs. We assessed performance using the 
average probability assigned to the true diagnoses. 
2.6 RESULTS 
Figure 3 plots the average performance -the probability 
assigned to the true diagnosis-for the four-disease net­
work against the four levels of noise on the link, leak, and 
prior probabilities. Plots for the two-disease and three-dis­
ease networks are similar. We see that, as expected, 
increasing noise consistently degrades performance for 
each type of probability -link, leak, and prior. Perfor­
mance is relatively more sensitive to noise on links than to 
noise on priors or leaks. The effect of noise on the leaks 
and priors is indistinguishable for networks BN3 and BN4. 
The introduction of noise in the numerical probabilities 
does degrade performance, as expected. However, the 
amount of degradation is surprisingly small when one con­
siders the degree of noise. It appears that even large errors 
in the probabilities produces only modest degradations in 
performance 
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Figure 3. Effects of noise in the link, leak, and prior prob­
abilities on average diagnostic perfonnance for the BN4 
network. 
2.7 EFFECTS OF NOISE ON TRUE POSITIVES 
AND NEGATIVES 
Hitherto, our analysis has combined the probabilities 
assigned to true positives (TP)- i.e., the probability of 
the disease for cases in which the disease is present, and 
probabilities assigned to true negatives (TN)- i.e., the 
probability of no disease for cases in which the disease is 
absent. We can obtain interesting insights that help 
explain our results by examining the effects of noise on 
these two measures separately. Figure 3 plots the average 
probability assigned to the true diagnosis separately for TP 
and TN, as a function of the noise level in the link, leak, 
and prior probabilities. These results were similar for each 
of the three networks. Accordingly, for simplicity, 
Figure 3 shows results averaged over the three networks. 
The first point to note is that, without noise, the average 
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Figure 4. Effect of noise in the link, leak, and prior proba­
bilities on the true positive and negative probabilities, 
averaged over BN2, BN3, and BN4. 
perfonnance for true negatives (TN) at 0.97 is substan­
tially better than for true positives (TP) at 0.73. In other 
words, the system is more likely to miss a disease that is 
present than to falsely diagnose a disease that is not 
present. This tendency to underdiagnose should be 
expected because the prevalence of diseases in the test 
cases is much larger than would be expected according to 
the prior probabilities on the diseases. Note that we delib­
erately generated most of the test cases to contain one or 
more diseases to provide more information on diagnostic 
perfonnance on interesting cases, even though according 
to the priors, more cases would have no diseases. 
Now let us look at the effect of noise levels on TP and TN . 
Noise in the link probabilities significantly degrades per­
formance for TP, but has no statistically detectable effect 
on TN (a.= 0.05). Conversely, noise in the leak probabili­
ties has no statistically detectable effect on TP at noise lev­
els cr= 1 and cr = 2, but leak noise significantly degrades 
TN. Finally, noise in the priors has a similar, slight, but 
significant, effect in degrading performance on both TP 
and TN. At the highest noise setting, cr = 3, the perfor­
mance of networks with leak noise and prior noise sharply 
decline because the disruption to the probability values is 
so extreme (Figure 2). 
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Figure 5. Evidence weights for a disease from a single 
positive and negative finding as a function of the link prob­
ability, without noise and with sigma=2 noise. Note that 
noise tends to decrease the evidence weight for both posi-
tive and negative findings. 
Why should link noise and leak noise show these contrary 
effects on TP and TN? We can explain these results by 
analyzing the role of the link and leak probabilities in the 
diagnosis. For simplicity, let us consider the effect of a sin­
gle finding F, being present, f, or absent, -f, on the poste­
rior odds of a single disease D. A standard measure of the 
strength of diagnostic evidence is the log-likelihood ratio, 
also known as the evidence weight: 
_ [ P(Jid) ] 
EW(f,D) - log10 P(!J-.d) 
_
 
[ P( --fid) l EW( --{,D) - log10 P( --{j--,d) 
P(j I d), the probability of the finding when the disease is 
present is: 
P(/id) = 1- (1- Leak(F))(l- Link(D,F)) 
=Leak( F)+ Link(D,F)(l- Leak(F)) 
P(j\-d), the probability of the finding when the disease is 
absent, is the leak probability, Leak(F). We can now 
rewrite the likelihoods in terms of the link and leak proba­
bilities. 
EW(j D)= lo 
[ leak( F)+ link( D. F)(J-leak(F))] 
' g10 leak(F) 
(3) 
EW( --,f,D) = log10(1-link(D,F)] (4) 
Notice the leak probability does not play a role in the neg­
ative evidence weight (Eq. 4), because if a finding is 
absent then the leak must be 'off by definition. 
Figure 5 plots the evidence weights for positive and nega­
tive findings, as a function of the link probability, and the 
mean evidence weight with 2 sigma noise in the link prob­
ability. It demonstrates that, on the average, noise in the 
link decreases the evidence weight for the finding. This 
effect arises from the fact that the evidence weights are 
concave functions of the link probability. Accordingly, the 
noise in the links will tend to reduce the probability 
assigned to the true positive, reducing performance as 
noise increases. Noise in the links, by reducing the eviden­
tial strength of findings can only increase the probability 
assigned to true negative, but this effect is undetectable 
because the true negative rate is already high. 
The impact of noise on the positive evidence (Eq. 3) is 
bounded by the value of the leak. The smaller the leak, the 
greater the possible effect on the positive evidence. In con­
trast, the negative evidence weight (Eq. 4) can be signifi­
cantly decreased if the link probability is close to 1.0, as is 
the case with sensitive findings. 
A related argument demonstrates that noise in leak proba­
bilities will tend to increase the strength of evidence on the 
average. In consequence, noise in leaks also tends to 
increase false positives and so degrades performance for 
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true negatives. The effect on true positives is again not 
detectable. 
3 WHY SYMMETRIC UNCERTAINTY 
IN PROBABILITY DOES NOT MAT­
TER 
One reason that we may find these findings of robustness 
surprising may be due to a misapprehension of the nature 
of uncertainty about probability. Random noise in proba­
bility tends to be much less important than random noise 
in other quantities of interest, because, when averaged 
over many cases, we should care only about the average or 
expected probability. This is reflected in the scoring rule 
that we used in our study, the average probability assigned 
to the disease that is present, or to its absence if the disease 
is absent. We should not care about imprecisions in esti­
mating the probabilities or other sources of noise in the 
system if they do not affect the expected probability. In 
other words, any symmetrical distribution of noise around 
the "gold standard" probability will not affect the score of 
the system. 
For example, suppose that in a set of cases with findings F, 
the probability of disease D being present, P(DIF) = 0.7, 
and that a diagnostic expert system A, computes a poste­
rior probability forD of PA(DIF). The score for this per­
formance, computed as above, as the probability assigned 
to the correct diagnosis, is given by: 
S(A) = P(D)IF) PA(DIF) + [1- P(DIF)][I-PA(DIF)] (5) 
If we assume that A is well-calibrated, so that 
PA(DIF )=0.7, the score is 
S(A) = 0.7 >< 0.7 +(I - 0.7) (1 - 0.7) 
= 0.49 + 0.09 = 0.56 (6) 
Now consider a diagnostic expert system, B, which is sub­
ject to severe random noise, such that it estimates the pos­
terior probability of D half the time P 8(DIF)= I and half 
the time P8(DIF)=0.4. Note that B is still well-calibrated 
because the expected probability given by B over the noise 
is given by E[P8(D I F)] = 0.5 x 1 + 0.5 x 0.4 = 0.7. The 
score for B will be: 
S(B) = E[P(DI F) x P8(DI F) 
+ [1 - P(D1 F)] [1 - P8 (DI F)]] (7) 
S(B) = P(DI F) x E[P8(D I F)] 
+[I - P(DI F)] [I - E[P8 (DI F)]] (8) 
S(B) = 0.7 x 0.7 +[I- 0.7] [I- 0.7] = 0.56 (9) 
In other words, the score is the same for expert systems A 
and B. More generally, A and B will have the same score 
provided the noise to which B is subject does not change 
the expected value of the posterior probability estimated 
by B, i.e. 
E[P8(D I F)]= PA(DI F) (10) 
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Therefore, any kind of noise in B's estimates PB(D I F) 
that does not affect the expectation of the estimate will not 
degrade the performance of B using an average measure. 
In some cases, of course, B may do worse than A -but in 
other cases it will do better. On the average it will do the 
same. In this way, probability is unlike other quantities of 
interest - such as, a patient's blood pressure or the net 
present value of an investment- where imprecision in the 
measurement may affect the utility of the measurement 
even if it does not affect the expected value. 
4 EFFECT OF LOGODDS NORMAL 
ERROR 
If symmetric uncertainty about probabilities has no effect 
on results, what effect might asymmetric uncertainty 
have? There is reason to believe that uncertainty about 
probabilities may often be asymmetric. For example, an 
expert may believe that a finding, F, is very probable 
given a disease, D, but not certain. Suppose the expert pro­
vides P( FID )=p, with p=0.9 as her best estimate of the 
conditional probability, but feels quite uncertain. Her 
belief that the relationship is not certain implies that p < 
1.0. However, she may well feel that p=0.7 would not be 
surprising. The tight upper bound and loose lower value 
suggest an asymmetric distribution. 
We can also provide a mathematical argument for asym­
metric posterior probabilities for diagnosis with many 
uncertain sources of evidence. Suppose that we have n 
findings Fi for i=l ton that are conditionally independent, 
given a disease D. Using the standard log-odds formula­
tion of Bayes' rule, we have: 
Lo(D IF;, F'z .. . F,) = (11) 
n 
Lo(D) + L { Log10[P(F; I D)]- Log10[P(F; I D)l} 
i=l 
Let us view the uncertain link probabilities P(Fi ID) and 
P(Fi \D) as random variables. The posterior logodds is 
therefore the sum of differences between n pairs of ran­
dom variables. By the central limit theorem, the distribu­
tion over the logodds posterior will tend with increasing n 
to a normal distribution. Equivalently, the posterior odds 
will tend to a lognormal distribution and the posterior 
probability will tend to a logodds-normal distribution. This 
is one of the reasons we used logodds-nonnal noise in the 
experiments described above. The logodds-normal distri­
bution is, in general, asymmetric in probabilitty. 
Let us examine the effect of a logodds-normal uncertainty 
in posterior probabilities on the diagnostic performance of 
a belief network. Figure 6 shows the expected error, that is 
the absolute average difference in scores (probability 
assigned to true diagnoses) between "gold standard" prob­
ability and the noisy probability, as a function of the gold 
standard. The noise is applied as a logodds-normal with a 
varying beween 0 and 3, as shown on the key. 
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Figure 6. Effect of Log Odds Normal noise on diagnostic 
performance. 
For a gold-standard probability of 0.5, the expected error 
is zero. This result arises because the logodds-normal dis­
tribution is symmetric around 0.5. The expected error is 
also zero for gold standard probability near 0 or 1. The 
expected error is largest for intermediate probabilities. The 
largest expected error for cr = 0.3 is about 0.021 at about 
p=0.25 and p=0.75. Larger expected errors occur for at 
extreme noise levels of cr = 1.0 and cr = 3.0. As we have 
mentioned before, noise levels of cr � 1.0 are very 
extreme. For such values of cr, the second-order probabil­
ity density functions are bimodal, with peaks at 0 and 1 
Figure 2 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
A better understanding of sensitivity to errors or noise in 
numerical probability can help guide the builder of belief 
networks in deciding how much effort it is worth putting 
into probability assessment-whether probabilities are 
assessed directly by experts, or estimated empirically from 
collected patient case data. It could also help us under­
stand what levels of precision in diagnosis we can expect 
given the inevitable imprecision in the input probabilities. 
A better understanding of the relative sensitivity to links, 
leaks, and priors could help guide the knowledge engineer 
in allocating effort in assessing these three classes of prob­
ability. 
In this paper, we have examined the sensitivity of several 
belief networks on diagnostic performance to imprecision 
in the representation of the numerical probabilities. Over­
all, we have found a surprising level of robustness to 
imprecision in the probabilities. Here we summarize the 
key findings, explore their implications, and discuss their 
limitations. 
The addition of massive amounts of random noise to the 
link, leak, and prior probabilities produced only modest 
decrements in diagnostic performance. Noise in the link 
probabilities had the largest effect in reducing perfor­
mance for all three networks. Noise in the leak and prior 
probabilities had smaller effects, but performance consis­
tently degraded with the level of noise for all three net­
works. 
The surprisingly small effect of large amounts of random 
noise should be reassuring for those constructing belief 
networks. The results presented here-together with addi­
tional results from studies [Pradhan, Henrion, Provan, Del 
Favero, and Huang, 1996] of different mappings , reduc­
tions in the number of levels used (e.g., severities of dis­
eases and findings), and studies of the impact of 
unrepresented nodes (e.g., diseases not present in the 
CPCS subnetworks)-provide empirical evidence that it is 
much more important to obtain the correct qualitative 
information. It is more important to identify findings, and 
diseases, IPSs, and their relationships, than to quantify the 
relations with a high level of precision. Experience sug­
gests that domain experts are much more comfortable pro­
viding these kinds of qualitative knowledge than they are 
providing quantitative probabilities, although use of prob­
ability elicitation methods can make the latter more 
acceptable. Knowledge that high levels of precision are 
not necessary should greatly improve acceptance of these 
techniques. 
Ultimately the purpose of any diagnostic system is to lead 
to better decisions-more cost-effective treatments of dis­
eases, or repair to complex artifacts. In this paper, we have 
measured performance by accuracy of diagnosis, not by 
improved decisions. However, if imprecision in the repre­
sentation does not degrade the diagnosis, it should not 
degrade the decision. In general, diagnostic accuracy is 
more sensitive to imprecision in the model of system being 
diagnosed than is the quality of the decision. Therefore, 
where we find that the quality of diagnosis is robust to 
imprecision, we can be confident that the quality of deci­
sions will be equally or more robust. 
W hile we believe that these results provide intriguing and 
suggestive evidence, we should caution that they should 
not be viewed as definitive for all BN s. First, note that 
these results are for a diagnostic application. There is rea­
son to believe that predictive applications may show 
greater sensitivity. Second, these networks, like most 
existing large BNs, use noisy-OR influences, or their gen­
eralization to noisy MAX influences. In fact, in most diag­
nostic belief networks constructed hitherto, the large 
majority of influences are noisy OR links. But, BNs that 
make extensive use of other types of influence may show 
different sensitivities. 
In addition, our results are specific to the types of noise 
and the measure of diagnostic performance studied here. 
It would be interesting to study noise intended to mode 
systematic cognitive biases that have been observed in 
psychological studies of probability elicitation and human 
reasoning under uncertainty. 
It may be possible to improve on our measure of perfor-
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mance. Our experiments and our performance measure 
have a major advantage over some alternatives that gauge 
consistency with a diagnostic network's assessment of 
probability. Because we generate the test data, we know 
whether diseases are actually present in the test cases. Our 
measure reflects "real" diagnostic accuracy in that it takes 
account of the true diagnoses rather than relying com­
pletely on subjective assessments, such as might be pro­
vided by an expert. On the other hand, our measure is not 
a proper scoring rule. (A scoring rule is proper if it maxi­
mizes the expected score of an assessor when they report 
their true assessment of probabilities.) Since our measure 
is a linear score, it can reward assignments by noisy net­
works that disagree with the assignments of noise-free net­
works. Also, unlike some scoring rules, (e.g., the Brier 
score), our measure does not separate different aspects of 
performance such as calibration errors and discrimination 
between different levels of probability. It may also be 
worthwhile to develop methods to account for differences 
between the frequencies that are present in the test data 
and the empirical frequencies used to construct the net­
work and the frequencies that are seen in actual diagnostic 
practice. 
Clearly, there is a need for additional work to explore these 
possibilities. While we believe that further experimental 
work is essential, we expect that theoretical analysis will 
also help to provide a deeper understanding of some of the 
findings, and suggest profitable avenues for further experi­
mentation. 
We are not the first to argue that the conclusions of diag­
nostic and other expert systems may have low sensitivity 
to imprecision in the numerical parameters. However, in 
heuristic representations where both the structural assump­
tions embody unexplicated simplifications of principles of 
rationality, it is often hard to separate the question of 
numerical approximations from structural simplifications. 
In the context of a probabilistic belief network, it is possi­
ble to be clear about both structural simplifications, such 
as independence assumptions , and the effects of numerical 
approximation, and so differentiate among these potential 
sources of error, in a way that is impossible in heuristic 
representations of uncertainty. 
Our results lend support for the value of qualitative proba­
bilistic representations, such as the QPNs [Wellman 1990, 
Henrion and Druzdzel 1990] and infinitesimal probability 
schemes [Goldszmidt and Pearl 1992].lndeed, we have 
performed some initial experimental comparisons of the 
performance of a BN for machine diagnosis using a quali­
tative infinitesimal representation (the 1C calculus) with a 
numerical BN. We found little difference in diagnostic 
performance between the numerical and infinitesimal rep­
resentations for cases with small fault priors [Henrion, et 
al. 1994]. The findings we have presented here help to 
explain the small differences between the qualitative and 
quantitative representations. 
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